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I. INTRODUCTION 
This paper corresponds to a written version of the presentation made at 
the Symposium that took place in October 2018 at Florida International 
University to celebrate the 70th Anniversary of the International Law 
Commission (ILC). The theme of the Symposium was “The Role and 
Contributions of the International Law Commission to the Development of 
International Law in the Past/Next 70 Years: Codification, Progressive 
Development, or Both?”  
The objective of the panel I had the honor to participate in was to discuss 
the ILC’s past practice on progressive development and codification of 
International Law, so as to set the scene for the broader discussion on the sort 
of “existential” question that faces the ILC at 70 for its future work regarding 
topics on its agenda and the fulfillment of the ILC’s mandate regarding the 
codification and/or progressive development of International Law. 
Having in mind the Statute and the mandate of the ILC, the goal of the 
presentation at the Symposium was—rather than to promote an abstract 
debate on the notions of progressive development and codification—to 
present an empirical brief study of the ILC’s past practice regarding the two 
main tasks of its mandate, which are mentioned in Article 13.1.a of the United 
 
* Member of the International Law Commission. Professor of International Law at the Autonomous 
University of Lisbon. The views expressed in the present contribution are in a personal capacity. 
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Nations Charter1 and defined in Article 15 of the ILC Statute in the following 
manner:  
“[P]rogressive development of international law” is used for 
convenience as meaning the preparation of draft conventions 
on subjects which have not yet been regulated by 
international law or in regard to which the law has not yet 
been sufficiently developed in the practice of States. 
Similarly, the expression “codification of international law” 
is used for convenience as meaning the more precise 
formulation and systematization of rules of international law 
in fields where there already has been extensive State 
practice, precedent and doctrine.2 
Given the limited time for the presentation, the brief empirical study was 
focused on three key areas of International Law that the ILC has worked on, 
that also correspond to three major projects accomplished so far by the ILC: 
the Law of the Sea (1956); the Law of Treaties (1966); and the Law of State 
Responsibility (2001). The empirical study was based essentially in the 
analysis of the commentaries adopted by the ILC together with these projects 
at the first and/or second reading stages. The usual method of work of the 
ILC entails a first reading, which is adopted by the ILC and then sent to 
Governments for observations, before a second and final reading that 
completes the work of the ILC on a given topic. 
Commentaries written on first reading may include minority views 
within the ILC, as well as a description of alternative solutions sought, while 
commentaries to draft articles adopted on second reading reflect only the 
decisions and positions taken by the ILC as a whole. Only the commentaries 
were looked at and not doctrinal sources or the case-law of the International 
Court of Justice or other international courts and tribunals. Thus, the aim was 
to find out if and how the ILC itself characterized its work on the above 
mentioned three topics for the purposes of its mandate of progressive 
development and codification of International Law. Based on the findings of 
such study, some conclusions are drawn at the end. 
 
1 “The General Assembly shall initiate studies and make recommendations for the purpose of: 
promoting international co-operation in the political field and encouraging the progressive development 
of international law and its codification.” U.N. Charter art. 13, ¶ 1.a. 
2 G.A. Res. 174(II), Statute of the International Law Commission, art 15 (Nov. 21, 1947) 
(emphasis added) (as amended by subsequent resolutions). 
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II. LAW OF THE SEA 
One of the initial projects developed by the ILC related to the Law of 
the Sea. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) 
of 1982, which contains a comprehensive regime on the Law of the Sea that 
is currently in force and even considered as a “Constitution” of the Oceans, 
was not based on a draft initially prepared by the ILC. However, its 
predecessors—the Geneva Conventions of 1958 on different aspects of the 
Law of the Sea—were based on drafts initially prepared by the ILC. 
The ILC worked intensively on this topic between 1949 and 1956. It 
produced a single set of Draft Articles with commentaries on the Law of the 
Sea in 1956.3 In 1958, having as basis the Draft Articles prepared by the ILC, 
four Geneva Conventions were concluded relating to the Territorial Sea and 
the Contiguous Zone, the High Seas, the Continental Shelf and the Fishing 
and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas. 
The Draft Articles prepared by the ILC in 1956 contained Draft Article 
71 regarding the “Exploration of the Continental Shelf and exploitation of its 
natural resources.”4 This Draft Article later became Article 5 of the 
Continental Shelf Convention of 1958.5 
 
3 Text adopted by the International Law Commission at its eighth session, in 1956, and submitted 
to the General Assembly as a part of the Commission’s report covering the work of that session (para. 33). 
Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, 11 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 9, at 1, 
U.N. Doc. A/3159 (1956), reprinted in [1956] 2 Y.B. INT’L L. COMM’N 253, U.N. Doc 
A/CN.4/SER.A/1956/Add.1 (future pincites will reference the page of the yearbook in which the report is 
reprinted) [hereinafter Law of the Sea Draft]. 
4 Id. at 299: 
1. The exploration of the continental shelf and the exploitation of its natural resources must not result 
in any unjustifiable interference with navigation, fishing or the conservation of the living resources 
of the sea. 
 
2. Subject to the provisions of paragraphs 1 and 5 of this article, the coastal State is entitled to 
construct and maintain on the continental shelf installations necessary for the exploration and 
exploitation of its natural resources, establish safety zones at a reasonable distance around such 
installations, and take in those zones measures necessary for their protection.   
 
3. Such installations, though under the jurisdiction of the coastal State, do not possess the status of 
islands. They have no territorial sea of their own, and their presence does not affect the delimitation 
of the territorial sea of the coastal State. 
 
4. Due notice must be given of any such installations constructed, and permanent means for giving 
warning of their presence must be maintained. 
 
5. Neither the installations themselves, nor the said safety zones around them may be established in 
narrow channels or where interference may be caused in recognized sea lanes essential to 
international navigation. 
5 Continental Shelf Convention art. 5, June 10, 1964, 499 U.N.T.S. 311: 
 
04 - GALVAO TELES.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 9/26/19 12:55 PM 
1030 FIU Law Review [Vol. 13:1027 
In Paragraph 1 of the Commentary, the following was stated: 
The progressive development of international law, which 
takes place against the background of established rules, must 
often result in the modification of those rules by reference to 
new interests or needs. The extent of that modification must 
be determined by the relative importance of the needs and 
interests involved. To lay down, therefore, that the 
exploration and exploitation of the continental shelf must 
never result in any interference whatsoever with navigation 
and fishing might result in many cases in rendering 
somewhat nominal both the sovereign rights of exploration 
and exploitation and the very purpose of the articles as 
adopted.  
 
 
1. The exploration of the continental shelf and the exploitation of its natural resources must not result 
in any unjustifiable interference with navigation, fishing or the conservation of the living resources 
of the sea, nor result in any interference with fundamental oceanographic or other scientific research 
carried out with the intention of open publication. 
 
2. Subject to the provisions of paragraphs 1 and 6 of this article, the coastal State is entitled to 
construct and maintain or operate on the continental shelf installations and other devices necessary 
for its exploration and the exploitation of its natural resources, and to establish safety zones around 
such installations and devices and to take in those zones measures necessary for their protection. 
 
3. The safety zones referred to in paragraph 2 of this article may extend to a distance of 500 metres 
around the installations and other devices which have been erected, measured from each point of 
their outer edge. Ships of all nationalities must respect these safety zones.  
 
4. Such installations and devices, though under the jurisdiction of the coastal State, do not possess 
the status of islands. They have no territorial sea of their own, and their presence does not affect the 
delimitation of the territorial sea of the coastal State. 
 
5. Due notice must be given of the construction of any such installations, and permanent means for 
giving warning of their presence must be maintained. Any installations which are abandoned or 
disused must be entirely removed.  
 
6. Neither the installations or devices, nor the safety zones around them, may be established where 
interference may be caused to the use of recognized sea lanes essential to international navigation. 
 
7. The coastal State is obliged to undertake, in the safety zones, all appropriate measures for the 
protection of the living resources of the sea from harmful agents. 
 
8. The consent of the coastal State shall be obtained in respect of any research concerning the 
continental shelf and undertaken there. Nevertheless, the coastal State shall not normally withhold 
its consent if the request is submitted by a qualified institution with a view to purely scientific 
research into the physical or biological characteristics of the continental shelf, subject to the proviso 
that the coastal State shall have the right, if it so desires, to participate or to be represented in the 
research, and that in any event the results shall be published. 
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The case is clearly one of assessment of the relative 
importance of the interests involved. Interference, even if 
substantial, with navigation and fishing might, in some 
cases, be justified. On the other hand, interference even on 
an insignificant scale would be unjustified if unrelated to 
reasonably conceived requirements of exploration and 
exploitation of the continental shelf. While, in the first 
instance, the coastal State must be the judge of the 
reasonableness—or the justification—of the measures 
adopted, in case of dispute the matter must be settled on the 
basis of article 73, which governs the settlement of all 
disputes regarding the interpretation or application of the 
articles.6 
This instance is the only meaningful reference in the whole of the 
commentaries to substantive issues of progressive development or 
codification. 
It is interesting to note that the ILC added a new dimension to the 
definition of progressive development originally contained in the Statute, by 
referring that progressive development must often result in the modification 
of established rules by reference to new interests and needs and that the extent 
of that modification must be determined by the relative importance of the 
needs and interests involved. 
III. LAW OF TREATIES 
The work on the Law of Treaties has possibly been one of the most 
significant contributions of the International Law Commission so far. The 
Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties of 1966, which work started in 1949, 
were the basis for the Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties of 1969. In 
the Draft Articles adopted in Second Reading with Commentaries,7 there is 
no explicit distinction between progressive development and codification in 
the text of the commentaries, which contain general references to the task to 
“codify the modern law of treaties.” 
We would propose to concentrate on two particular Draft Articles, 
which contain important features of the current Law of Treaties but that, at 
 
6 Law of the Sea Draft, supra note 3, at 299 (emphasis added). 
7 Text adopted by the International Law Commission at its eighteenth session, in 1966, and 
submitted to the General Assembly as part of the Commission’s report covering the work of that session 
(para. 38). The report, which also contains commentaries on the draft articles, appears in YEARBOOK OF 
THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION vol. II 1966. Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with 
Commentaries, [1966] 2 Y.B. Int.’l L. Comm’n 187, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER. A/1966/Add. 1. 
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the time of their drafting generated significant discussion. The first one is 
Draft Article 50 dealing with jus cogens and later became Article 538 of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. The second is Draft Article 59 
on fundamental change of circumstances that subsequently became Article 
629 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. 
Paragraph 1 of the Commentary relating to Draft Article 5010—Treaties 
conflicting with a peremptory norm of general international law (jus 
cogens)—stated the following: 
The view that in the last analysis there is no rule of 
international law from which States cannot at their own free 
will contract out has become increasingly difficult to sustain, 
although some jurists deny the existence of any rules of jus 
cogens in international law, since in their view even the most 
general rules still fall short of being universal. The 
Commission pointed out that the law of the Charter 
concerning the prohibition of the use of force in itself 
constitutes a conspicuous example of a rule in international 
law having the character of jus cogens. Moreover, if some 
Governments in their comments have expressed doubts as to 
 
8  Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 53, opened for signature May 23, 1969, 8 I.L.M. 
679, 698–99 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980): 
A treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory norm of general 
international law. For the purposes of the present Convention, a peremptory norm of general 
international law is a norm accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a 
whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a 
subsequent norm of general international law having the same character. 
9  Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 8, art. 62: 
1. A fundamental change of circumstances which has occurred with regard to those existing at the 
time of the conclusion of a treaty, and which was not foreseen by the parties, may not be invoked as 
a ground for terminating or withdrawing from the treaty unless: (a) the existence of those 
circumstances constituted an essential basis of the consent of the parties to be bound by the treaty; 
and (b) the effect of the change is radically to transform the extent of obligations still to be performed 
under the treaty. 
 
2. A fundamental change of circumstances may not be invoked as a ground for terminating or 
withdrawing from a treaty: (a) if the treaty establishes a boundary; or (b) if the fundamental change 
is the result of a breach by the party invoking it either of an obligation under the treaty or of any 
other international obligation owed to any other party to the treaty. 
 
3. If, under the foregoing paragraphs, a party may invoke a fundamental change of circumstances as 
a ground for terminating or withdrawing from a treaty it may also invoke the change as a ground for 
suspending the operation of the treaty. 
10  Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with Commentaries, supra note 7, art. 50: “A treaty is 
void if it conflicts with a peremptory norm of general international law from which no derogation is 
permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the 
same character.” 
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the advisability of this article unless it is accompanied by 
provision for independent adjudication, only one questioned 
the existence of rules of jus cogens in the international law 
of today. Accordingly, the Commission concluded that in 
codifying the law of treaties it must start from the basis that 
today there are certain rules from which States are not 
competent to derogate at all by a treaty arrangement, and 
which may be changed only by another rule of the same 
character.11 
Paragraph 3 of the Commentary to Draft Article 50 added the following: 
The emergence of rules having the character of jus cogens is 
comparatively recent, while international law is in process 
of rapid development. The Commission considered the right 
course to be to provide in general terms that a treaty is void 
if it conflicts with a rule of jus cogens and to leave the full 
content of this rule to be worked out in State practice and in 
the jurisprudence of international tribunals.12 
With regard to integrating the concept of peremptory norms of general 
international law (jus cogens) in the codification of the Law of Treaties, the 
position of the ILC seemed to be thus one of principle rather than based on 
the practice of States, which was in rapid development but not fully settled, 
at the moment of the elaboration of the Draft Articles, and that the full content 
of the rule would be later on worked out in State practice and jurisprudence 
of international tribunals. 
With regard to Draft Article 5913 on Fundamental Change of 
Circumstances, Paragraph 10 of the Commentary stated that:  
Certain Governments in their comments emphasized the 
dangers which this article may have for the security of 
treaties unless it is made subject to some form of 
 
11  See id. at 247. 
12  See id. at 248. 
13  Id. at 256–57, art. 59: 
1. A fundamental change of circumstances which has occurred with regard to those existing at the 
time of the conclusion of a treaty, and which was not foreseen by the parties, may not be invoked as 
a ground for terminating or withdrawing from the treaty unless: (a) The existence of those 
circumstances constituted an essential basis of the consent of the parties to be bound by the treaty; 
and (b) The effect of the change is radically to transform the scope of obligations still to be performed 
under the treaty.  
 
2. A fundamental change of circumstances may not be invoked: (a) As a ground for terminating or 
withdrawing from a treaty establishing a boundary; (b) If the fundamental change is the result of a 
breach by the party invoking it either of the treaty or of a different international obligation owed to 
the other parties to the treaty. 
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independent adjudication. Many members of the 
Commission also stressed the importance which they 
attached to the provision of adequate procedural safeguards 
against arbitrary application of the principle of fundamental 
change of circumstances as an essential condition of the 
acceptability of the article. In general, however, the 
Commission did not consider the risks to the security of 
treaties involved in the present article to be different in kind 
or degree from those involved in the articles dealing with the 
various grounds of invalidity or in articles 57, 58 and 61. It 
did not think that a principle, valid in itself, could or should 
be rejected because of a risk that a State acting in bad faith 
might seek to abuse the principle. The proper function of 
codification, it believed, was to minimize those risks by 
strictly denning and circumscribing the conditions under 
which recourse may properly be had to the principle; and this 
it has sought to do in the present article. In addition, having 
regard to the extreme importance of the stability of treaties 
to the security of international relations, it has attached to the 
present article, as to all the articles dealing with grounds of 
invalidity or termination, the specific procedural safeguards 
set out in article 62.14 
It is relevant to note that even with regard to more progressive or 
innovative solutions again provided by this Draft Article on Fundamental 
Change of Circumstances, the ILC emphasized that it was performing an 
exercise of codification and that if the provision is a matter of principle, even 
subject to a risk of abuse, such concerns could be alleviated by attaching to 
such norms adequate procedural safeguards that were also included in the 
Draft Articles. 
IV. LAW OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY 
The work of the ILC on State Responsibility has also been one of its 
most significant contributions. The topic was on the agenda of the 
Commission between 1954 and 2001. 
Although so far no instrument was concluded under the auspices of the 
United Nations on the basis of prior drafts prepared by the ILC and the topic 
is still under consideration by the 6th Committee of the UN General 
 
14 Id. at 260.  
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Assembly,15 it is worth looking at the Draft Articles with Commentaries 
adopted by the ILC upon First Reading in 1996 and on Second Reading in 
2001. 
Continuing with its past practice, the references in the commentaries to 
codification and/or progressive development are not abundant. However, the 
ILC does go a bit further than in the cases analyzed above regarding the Law 
of the Sea or the Law of Treaties. 
In the Draft Articles with Commentaries adopted in First Reading in 
1996,16 the ILC referred to the following in Paragraph 12 of the commentary 
to Chapter II (The “act of the State” under International Law):  
The Commission has thus set itself the task of determining 
what conduct international law actually attributes to the 
State, basing itself primarily on the findings which result 
from an examination of State practice and the decisions of 
international tribunals. It is this method by which the 
Commission will mainly be guided in drawing up the 
provisions of chapter II of this draft. The solutions derived 
from practice and judicial decisions will be supplemented, 
where necessary, by elements of progressive development.17 
And Paragraph 13 of the commentary to Chapter III (Breach of an 
international obligation) added that: 
Lastly, the Commission wishes to point out that, in preparing 
the material which is the subject matter of this new chapter 
of the draft, it relies, as in the previous chapters, on the 
inductive method followed by the Special Rapporteur in his 
reports. Thus State practice and international judicial 
decisions are analyzed and, on the basis of that analysis, the 
rules to be laid down are formulated. Nevertheless, account 
must be taken of the fact that, at least in regard to certain 
points, the wealth of precedents is not the same, for example, 
as it is for determining criteria for the attribution of an act to 
the State. Where necessary, therefore, this lack has to be 
made good by giving careful consideration, as a source of 
guidance for formulating certain rules, to the true 
 
15 See G.A. Res. 71/133 (Dec. 13, 2016); G.A. Res. 68/104 (Dec. 16, 2013); G.A. Res 65/19 (Dec. 
6, 2010); G.A. Res. 62/61 (Dec. 6, 2007); G.A. Res. 59/35 (Dec. 2, 2004); G.A. Res. 56/83 (Dec. 12, 
2001). 
16 See Draft Articles on State Responsibility With Commentaries Thereto Adopted by the 
International Law Commission On First Reading (January 1997), 
http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/9_6_1996.pdf. 
17 Id. at 18.    
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requirements of the contemporary international community 
and to the more authoritative ideas and tendencies which are 
emerging. In other words, the progressive development of 
international law sometimes has to take precedence over 
codification in the strict sense.18 
In the introductory comments, thus, in the First Reading, the ILC 
recognized that its work on State Responsibility was mostly an exercise of 
codification, but where necessary supplemented or even giving way to 
progressive development where there is lack of precedent, requirements of 
the contemporary international community and tendencies which are 
emerging.  
Nevertheless, it was still hesitant to openly qualify its work specifically 
with regard to the binary of codification and progressive development. 
Perhaps the most striking example regards Draft Article 1919 on 
“International Crimes and International Delicts” which was undoubtedly one 
of the proposals of the First Reading text of 1996 that generated more 
discussion, criticism, and even division. Even in this case, in the First 
Reading Commentaries, the ILC was not clear about the nature of its work, 
having put it in the following terms in Paragraph 73 of the commentary to 
Draft Article 19: 
 
18 Id. at 87–88.  
19 Id. at 105–06:  
1. An act of a State which constitutes a breach of an international obligation is an internationally 
wrongful act, regardless of the subject-matter of the obligation breached.  
 
2. An internationally wrongful act which results from the breach by a State of an international 
obligation so essential for the protection of fundamental interests of the international community 
that its breach is recognized as a crime in that community as a whole constitutes an international 
crime.  
 
3. Subject to paragraph 2, and on the basis of the rules of international law in force, an international 
crime may result, inter alia, from: (a) a serious breach of an international obligation of essential 
importance for the maintenance of international peace and security, such as that prohibiting 
aggression; (b) a serious breach of an international obligation of essential importance for 
safeguarding the right of self-determination of peoples, such as that prohibiting the establishment or 
maintenance by force of colonial domination; (c) a serious breach on a widespread scale of an 
international obligation of essential importance for safeguarding the human being, such as those 
prohibiting slavery, genocide and apartheid; (d) a serious breach of an international obligation of 
essential importance for the safeguarding and preservation of the human environment, such as those 
prohibiting massive pollution of the atmosphere or of the seas.  
 
4. Any internationally wrongful act which is not an international crime in accordance with paragraph 
2 constitutes an international delict. 
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In conclusion, the Commission wishes to emphasize that it 
is aware of the exceptional importance of the subject dealt 
with in this article. In the codification of the law of 
international responsibility, the adoption of a formulation 
which expressly recognizes the distinction between 
international crimes and international delicts is a step 
comparable to that achieved by the explicit recognition of 
the category of rules of jus cogens in the codification of the 
law of treaties. The Commission is therefore convinced that 
the representatives of Governments will devote very special 
attention to this article when discussing its report.20 
Thus, the option of the ILC was to compare Draft Article 19 on International 
Crimes and Delicts to Jus Cogens and to draw the attention of State to the 
exceptional importance of this draft article. 
As it is well known, Draft Article 19 on International Crimes and Delicts 
did not make it to the Second Reading text, due to the strong opposition of 
Member States in the UN Sixth Committee, which led to a change in 
approach in the Commission in the Second Reading. In the text of the Draft 
Articles with Commentaries adopted on Second Reading in 2001,21 the 
Commission considered the distinction between crimes and delicts should be 
abandoned:  
Accordingly, the present articles do not recognize the 
existence of any distinction between State “crimes” and 
“delicts” for the purposes of Part One. On the other hand, it 
is necessary for the articles to reflect that there are certain 
consequences flowing from the basic concepts of 
peremptory norms of general international law and 
obligations to the international community as a whole within 
the field of State responsibility.22 
In the context of considering which would be the consequences flowing 
from jus cogens and erga omnes norms, the ILC took a step further in 
qualifying more explicitly its work, namely with regard to Articles 41 and 48 
as progressive development, though in a general exercise of codification and 
 
20 Id. at 132.  
21 Int’l L. Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Fifty-Third Session, U.N. Doc.A/56/10 (2001). Text 
adopted by the International Law Commission at its fifty-third session, in 2001, and submitted to the 
General Assembly as a part of the Commission’s report covering the work of that session (A/56/10). The 
report, which also contains commentaries on the draft articles, appears in the Yearbook of the International 
Law Commission, 2001, vol. II, Part Two, as corrected. 
22 Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with Commentaries 
[2001] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 111. 
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progressive development on the law on State Responsibility, as it is stated in 
Paragraph 1 of the General Commentary: 
These articles seek to formulate, by way of codification and 
progressive development, the basic rules of international law 
concerning the responsibility of States for their 
internationally wrongful acts. The emphasis is on the 
secondary rules of State responsibility: that is to say, the 
general conditions under international law for the State to be 
considered responsible for wrongful actions or omissions, 
and the legal consequences which flow therefrom. The 
articles do not attempt to define the content of the 
international obligations, the breach of which gives rise to 
responsibility. This is the function of the primary rules, 
whose codification would involve restating most of 
substantive customary and conventional international law.23 
More specifically, with regard to Draft Article 41,24 regarding 
“Particular consequences of a serious breach of an obligation under this 
chapter,” in Paragraph 3 of the Commentary, it is emphasized that:  
Neither does paragraph 1 prescribe what measures States 
should take in order to bring to an end serious breaches in 
the sense of article 40. Such cooperation must be through 
lawful means, the choice of which will depend on the 
circumstances of the given situation. It is, however, made 
clear that the obligation to cooperate applies to States 
whether or not they are individually affected by the serious 
breach. What is called for in the face of serious breaches is a 
joint and coordinated effort by all States to counteract the 
effects of these breaches. It may be open to question whether 
general international law at present prescribes a positive duty 
of cooperation, and paragraph 1 in that respect may reflect 
the progressive development of international law. But in fact 
 
23  Id. at 31, ¶ 1 (emphasis added). 
24  Id. at 113–14, art. 41. Draft Article 41: 
1. States shall cooperate to bring to an end through lawful means any serious breach within the 
meaning of article 40.  
 
2. No State shall recognize as lawful a situation created by a serious breach within the meaning of 
article 40, nor render aid or assistance in maintaining that situation.  
 
3. This article is without prejudice to the other consequences referred to in this part and to such 
further consequences that a breach to which this chapter applies may entail under international law. 
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such cooperation, especially in the framework of 
international organizations, is carried out already in response 
to the gravest breaches of international law and it is often the 
only way of providing an effective remedy. Paragraph 1 
seeks to strengthen existing mechanisms of cooperation, on 
the basis that all States are called upon to make an 
appropriate response to the serious breaches referred to in 
article 40.25 
So with regard to Draft Article 41/1, the Commentary refers that it 
“may” reflect the progressive development of international law, but without 
taking a definitive position and allowing the law to further develop in this 
direction. Concerning Draft Article 4826 on the subject of “Invocation of 
responsibility by a State other than an injured State,” Paragraph 12 of the 
Commentary clarified that:  
Under paragraph 2 (a), any State referred to in article 48 is 
entitled to request cessation of the wrongful act and, if the 
circumstances require, assurances and guarantees of non-
repetition under article 30. In addition, paragraph 2 (b) 
allows such a State to claim from the responsible State 
reparation in accordance with the provisions of chapter II of 
Part Two. In case of breaches of obligations under article 48, 
it may well be that there is no State which is individually 
injured by the breach, yet it is highly desirable that some 
State or States be in a position to claim reparation, in 
particular restitution. In accordance with paragraph 2 (b), 
such a claim must be made in the interest of the injured State, 
if any, or of the beneficiaries of the obligation breached. This 
aspect of article 48, paragraph 2, involves a measure of 
 
25  Id. at 114, ¶ 3. 
26  Id. at 126 art. 48. Draft Article 48: 
1. Any State other than an injured State is entitled to invoke the responsibility of another State in 
accordance with paragraph 2 if: (a) the obligation breached is owed to a group of States including 
that State, and is established for the protection of a collective interest of the group; or (b) the 
obligation breached is owed to the international community as a whole.  
 
2. Any State entitled to invoke responsibility under paragraph 1 may claim from the responsible 
State: (a) cessation of the internationally wrongful act, and assurances and guarantees of non-
repetition in accordance with article 30; and (b) performance of the obligation of reparation in 
accordance with the preceding articles, in the interest of the injured State or of the beneficiaries of 
the obligation breached.  
 
3. The requirements for the invocation of responsibility by an injured State under articles 43, 44 and 
45 apply to an invocation of responsibility by a State entitled to do so under paragraph 1. 
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progressive development, which is justified since it provides 
a means of protecting the community or collective interest at 
stake. In this context it may be noted that certain provisions, 
for example in various human rights treaties, allow 
invocation of responsibility by any State party.27 
And Paragraph 14 of the Commentary added that: 
Secondly, paragraph 3 allows for such further consequences 
of a serious breach as may be provided for by international 
law. This may be done by the individual primary rule, as in 
the case of the prohibition of aggression. Paragraph 3 
accordingly allows that international law may recognize 
additional legal consequences flowing from the commission 
of a serious breach in the sense of article 40. The fact that 
such further consequences are not expressly referred to in 
chapter III does not prejudice their recognition in present-
day international law, or their further development. In 
addition, paragraph 3 reflects the conviction that the legal 
regime of serious breaches is itself in a state of development. 
By setting out certain basic legal consequences of serious 
breaches in the sense of article 40, article 41 does not intend 
to preclude the future development of a more elaborate 
regime of consequences entailed by such breaches.28 
With regard to Articles 48/2 and 48/3, the ILC was careful in stating 
that, in the first case, the article involves a measure of progressive 
development and, in the latter case, that the current text that contains basic 
legal consequences does not intend to preclude the future development of a 
more elaborate regime. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The brief empirical analysis undertaken with regard to three major 
projects of the ILC regarding the Law of the Sea, Law of Treaties, and Law 
of State Responsibility illustrates the fact that the ILC has not qualified its 
own work as progressive development or codification on a systematic and 
thorough basis. 
In the three key projects analyzed, in fact, it only seldom did it. When it 
did so, it did it in a careful, cautious, and wise manner, not only because in 
 
27  Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, at 127, U.N. Doc. 
A/56/10 (2001), reprinted in [2001] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 127, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/2001/Add.1. 
28  Id. at 116.  
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practice the distinction between codification and progressive development is 
hard to perform in a rigorous way, but also because the ILC seemed to be 
conscious of the possibility of the continuing development of international 
law and to the catalyst effect its work may have on that development, given 
that the Draft Articles it produces may generate treaty rules that reflect 
customary international law. 
Compared with other topics that have also been on the agenda of the 
ILC, only on very few occasions has the ILC decided it was appropriate to 
make a clear statement with regard to the status of progressive development 
of a certain project or of particular provisions. For instance, with regard to 
the topic “Responsibility of International Organizations,” the Draft Articles 
with commentaries adopted in 201129 clearly refer in Paragraph 5 of the 
General Commentary that: 
The fact that several of the present draft articles are based on 
limited practice moves the border between codification and 
progressive development in the direction of the latter. It may 
occur that a provision in the articles on State responsibility 
could be regarded as representing codification, while the 
corresponding provision on the responsibility of 
international organizations is more in the nature of 
progressive development. In other words, the provisions of 
the present draft articles do not necessarily yet have the same 
authority as the corresponding provisions on State 
responsibility.30 
This is probably one of the single occasions where the ILC clarified that the 
whole of the Draft Articles was rather in the nature of progressive 
development and thus did not have the same authority of those concerning 
State Responsibility. 
 
29  Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/66/10 
(2011), reprinted in [2011] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 46–47, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/2001/Add.1. 
Adopted by the International Law Commission at its sixty-third session, in 2011, and submitted to the 
General Assembly as a part of the Commission’s report covering the work of that session (A/66/10). The 
report, which also contains commentaries to the draft articles (para. 88), appears in Yearbook of the 
International Law Commission, 2011, vol. II, Part Two.  
30  Id. 
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On the topic of “Diplomatic protection”, in the Draft Articles adopted 
in 2006,31 Paragraph 1 of the Commentary to Draft Article 1932 entitled 
“Recommended Practice” stressed that:  
There are certain practices on the part of States in the field 
of diplomatic protection which have not yet acquired the 
status of customary rules and which are not susceptible to 
transformation into rules of law in the exercise of 
progressive development of the law. Nevertheless they are 
desirable practices, constituting necessary features of 
diplomatic protection, that add strength to diplomatic 
protection as a means for the protection of human rights and 
foreign investment. These practices are recommended to 
States for their consideration in the exercise of diplomatic 
protection in draft article 19, which recommends that States 
“should” follow certain practices.33 
In this last case, the ILC has added a new possible dimension to its work 
that is neither codification nor progressive development, but recommended 
or desirable practices that States should follow when exercising the 
diplomatic protection on behalf of their nationals. 
In conclusion, this brief analysis has shown that the ILC has exercised 
in the past its mandate of progressive development and codification in a wise, 
discrete and restrained manner. The ILC has privileged the adoption of good 
legal solutions that will sustain the test of time and respond to the interests of 
the international community. In this regard, it has sought to avoid the risk of 
freezing the development of international law by over-classifying its work as 
one or the other track of its inseparable and interlinked mandate of 
progressive development and codification. 
 
31  Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, at 94, U.N. Doc. A/61/10 
(2006), reprinted in [2006] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 53, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/2006/Add.1. Text 
adopted by the International Law Commission at its fifty-eighth session, in 2006, and submitted to the 
General Assembly as a part of the Commission’s report covering the work of that session (A/61/10). The 
report, which also contains commentaries on the draft articles, appears in Yearbook of the International 
Law Commission, 2006, vol. II, Part Two. 
32 Draft Article 19:  
A State entitled to exercise diplomatic protection according to the present draft articles, should: (a) 
give due consideration to the possibility of exercising diplomatic protection, especially when a 
significant injury has occurred; (b) take into account, wherever feasible, the views of injured persons 
with regard to resort to diplomatic protection and the reparation to be sought; and (c) transfer to the 
injured person any compensation obtained for the injury from the responsible State subject to any 
reasonable deductions. 
33  Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, at 94, U.N. Doc. A/61/10 
(2006), reprinted in [2006] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 53, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/2006/Add.1.  
 
